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Does access to formal agricultural credit depend on
caste?
Abstract
This paper analyzes whether caste impedes access to formal agricultural
credit in India. Credit is provided mainly through cooperative and commer-
cial banks. Using national data, we find that cooperative banks discriminate
against lower caste borrowers, and find weak evidence that commercial banks
instead bias lending in their favor in accordance with aﬃrmative action poli-
cies. We compare the organizational structures of the two types of bank,
and explain discrimination by cooperative banks in terms of interest group
capture at the district level by showing that discrimination takes place in
those districts where higher castes dominate.
Keywords: Asia, India, caste, formal, credit, discrimination
1. Introduction
Social group identity is intricately related to economic outcomes, par-
ticularly in developing countries. In rural India, the historically entrenched
caste system wields significant influence on economic outcomes, an indicator
of which are the large diﬀerences in consumption expenditures between caste-
groups (Deshpande 2000). Caste can shape economic outcomes in two inter-
linked ways. The first is through socio-political processes and networks that
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operate largely independent of the State. These can determine cooperation
within communities (Dre`ze & Sen 2002), access to resources such as irrigation
water (Anderson 2011) and capital and labour inputs (Banerjee & Munshi
2004), or educational and occupational choices (Munshi & Rosenzweig 2006).
The second is through the eﬀect of group-identity on government policy and
the provision of services such as public goods (Banerjee et al. 2005; Baner-
jee & Somanathan 2007). In the second case, government policy might also
attempt to alleviate historical disadvantage through aﬃrmative action such
as political reservation (Pande 2003; Prakash & Chin 2011), or quotas in
government educational institutions (Bertrand et al. 2010) and public-sector
jobs (Weisskopf 2004).
Financial inclusion forms an important strand of aﬃrmative action poli-
cies in India. Burgess & Pande (2005) examine, for instance, how the large
expansion of branch banking services to previously unbanked locations dur-
ing 1969 to 1990 helped reduce poverty. Yet, the role of caste in determining
access to formal credit has not been examined in the literature using na-
tional data. In this paper, I use data from 2002-03 and focus on how caste
determines access to agricultural production credit. The latter is a crucial
determinant of rural incomes, and therefore constitutes an important focus
of financial aﬃrmative action. The bulk of formal agricultural credit is dis-
bursed through commercial and cooperative banks. Commercial banks are
large and centralized entities under the direct supervision of the Reserve
Bank of India1 (RBI), whose lending is expected to conform to aﬃrmative
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action policies and targets. Cooperative banks, in contrast, constitute a
large network of decentralized, independent entities, many aspects of whose
functioning are not directly controlled by the RBI2.
I first examine how the likelihood of borrowing any formal agricultural
credit changes with caste, and find that caste is not a significant determinant
of access once other household characteristics are taken into account. I then
disaggregate borrowings between commercial and cooperative banks, and use
bivariate probit models to analyze the influence of caste. I find that caste is
now significant, and that its influence diﬀers radically for the two types of
bank. Cooperative banks bias lending in favor of higher castes, indicating
the presence of negative discrimination against lower castes, while commercial
banks do not. Instead, there is weak evidence that commercial banks bias
lending in favor of lower-caste households, in accordance with aﬃrmative
action policies for financial inclusion.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that cooperative banks’
management structures are vulnerable to interest group capture through lo-
cal political influence. Unlike commercial banks which work with centralized
decision-making procedures under the direct supervision of the RBI, cooper-
ative banks are organized in a three-tiered aggregating structure, spanning
village, district and state levels. The district-level entities are expected to
act as mentors for village-level cooperatives under them. Given the organiza-
tional and political significance of the district in Indian administration, any
capture by interest groups is likely to take place at this level, and might be
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reflected in the lending behavior of cooperative banks accordingly.
I test for the possibility of interest-group capture by defining caste domi-
nance in the district in terms of agricultural land ownership, and analyze how
the probability of borrowing changes according to the dominant caste. While
the notion of dominant caste is multidimensional, Srinivas (1959) points to-
wards land ownership being an important indicator of dominance3. I find that
the negative discrimination by cooperative banks is visible mainly in those
districts where higher caste groups are dominant, and disappears otherwise,
lending support to the theory of capture by caste-based interest groups. This
is also consistent with several field studies which have studied lending prac-
tices in rural India using small samples (Sarap 1990; Jodhka 1995; Dre`ze et al.
1997). Finally, I also examine whether caste influences the amount of credit
borrowed, and whether interest rates and repayment rates diﬀer according
to caste.
2. Background
The caste system in India emerged as a hierarchical system of social
groupings within Hindus, where occupations were hereditary, and marriages
took place only within the same caste. While caste no longer determines oc-
cupation, it continues to play an important role through historically-acquired
capital, both tangible (land, money and other assets) and intangible—particularly
networks. The Indian government categorizes castes into three major groups;
the Scheduled Castes (SCs) who are the most disadvantaged (historically
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these were the Untouchables), the Other Backward Classes4 (OBCs) who
are of middling disadvantage, and Others, the traditionally privileged higher
castes. We exclude Scheduled Tribes (STs) from our analysis, an additional
category employed to classify tribal peoples, since STs have not, historically,
been part of the caste system5.
Recognizing caste-based socio-economic disadvantage as a major problem,
government policies have sought to provide a ‘level playing field’ through af-
firmative action in several areas. In financial services, aﬃrmative action is
based on caste as well as more generally defined socio-economic disadvan-
tage. The first All India Rural Credit Survey Committee Report (RBI 1954)
recognized that access to financial services was strongly dependent on socio-
economic status, and policy measures have since aimed to strengthen access
in rural areas, particularly for small farmers6.
The majority of formal credit in rural India is disbursed through coop-
erative and commercial banks. Beginning from the Indian Cooperative Act
of 1904 and the Cooperative Societies Act of 1912, cooperative banks today
have 120 million members (GOI, 2005), and are organized in a three-tiered
structure: Primary Agricultural Cooperative Societies (PACS) at the village
level, (district) Central Cooperative Banks (CCBs) at the district level, and
State Cooperative Banks (SCBs) at the state level7. Cooperative banks are
decentralized, and the district and state units oversee and guide the village-
level PACSs, helping them access financial resources and mitigate seasonal
patterns in the excess demand and supply of funds by working as clearing cen-
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tres. As Misra (2010) explains, districts—where CCBs operate—were chosen
as the first level of aggregation in view of organisational considerations, since
districts form the basic unit for civil administration.
The performance of CCBs and PACSs has been anything but encouraging,
and as of 2003 they had large accumulated losses for which poor governance
practices have been blamed (Shah et al. 2007). By design, CCBs are expected
to mainly have institutional members in the form of PACSs, however individ-
uals have formed an increasing proportion of membership, and constituted
86% of total members in 2007 (Misra 2010). In 2005, the government of In-
dia (GOI) set up a committee to review the functioning of cooperative banks
and recommend changes. The Vaidyanathan Committee report (GOI 2005)
took stock of several structural problems and made recommendations, which
included appointing democratically elected managements, board members
with ‘fit and proper criteria of eligibility’ (GOI 2005, 69), and professionally
qualified CEOs. The committee noted that governance structures in coop-
erative banks were impaired “because of politicisation of these institutions,
reflected in the fact that directors on Boards of Cooperative Banks are in-
volved in active politics either at the State, District, and Taluka level” (GOI
2005, 27).
Commercial banks, instead, function mainly as centralized institutions
with a large network of branches. In 1969, the Indian government national-
ized the 14 major commercial banks to bring them under the direct control of
the RBI, which enabled these banks to play a major role in pursuit of social
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objectives (Pande 2007). The need was also felt for a social banking program
that involved a major expansion in the number of branches, bringing financial
services to nearly 30,000 previously unbanked rural locations between 1969
and 1990 (Burgess & Pande 2005; Burgess et al. 2005). Alongside, ‘priority
sector’ lending has long been a focus of financial inclusion policies. Start-
ing from 1968 when the National Credit Council advised banks to increase
their finance to priority sectors, to 1985, when all commercial banks were
given a target of 40% finance to this sector from their overall lending portfo-
lio, the RBI has continued to encourage priority sector lending (RBI 2008).
The priority sector includes, amongst others, small and marginal farmers
and ‘weaker sections’, where the latter include SC and ST households. As
of 2002, the RBI specified that banks extend 10% of Net Bank Credit to
weaker sections (RBI 2002a). Policy guidelines urge banks to enable better
access to loans for Scheduled Castes, and this includes lending at lower rates
of interest (RBI 2002b; 2004; 2006).
While the policy perspective remains one of improving financial inclusion
for socially and economically disadvantaged, a key question is whether for-
mal lenders—mainly banks—discriminate between borrowers on the basis of
caste, i.e. base their lending decisions on factors which are not ‘objective’
(Becker 1971). The question of discrimination is distinct from overall issues
of access, even as the latter are no doubt important for economic growth and
alleviating poverty. Even in the absence of discrimination, profit-maximizing
banks can be expected to base their lending decisions on the availability of
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collateral and past default behavior. Disadvantaged borrowers will have less
assets to collateralize, so that even without discrimination, lower-caste bor-
rowers will receive fewer loans on average. The question of discrimination is
more serious than that of purely asset-based diﬀerences in access to credit,
since it implies, if prevalent, that lower castes are less likely to receive credit
even if they have suﬃcient assets to collaterialize8.
Given the crucial role of bank credit in a population largely dependent
on agriculture, this has serious implications for the larger policy agenda on
reducing poverty. Yet there is relatively little empirical research on house-
hold credit transactions and questions of socio-economic disadvantage using
quantitative data9. What national-level research does exist tends to focus
on the role of commercial banks. For example, Burgess & Pande (2005)
estimate how access to financial facilities increased for poorer and SC/ST
households as a result of the 1969-1990 banking expansion, and Banerjee
et al. (2004) examine the functioning of nationalised and private commercial
banks, and how their institutional structures relate to their expansion and
lending practices.
Other studies on credit in India include Kochar (1997) who examines
whether farmers are (formal) credit-constrained using data from Uttar Pradesh,
and Pal (2002) who studies the determinants of household credit choices us-
ing data from 3 South-Indian villages, and finds that upper-caste households
are more likely to borrow from the formal sector. Cole (2009) shows that
Indian banks are liable to political capture since there is a marked increase
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in agricultural lending during election years. Finally, field-studies have anal-
ysed borrowers and banks at close quarters and often over long periods of
time (mainly in northern India), and concluded that caste-based discrimina-
tion does take place alongside questionable or corrupt practices, in certain
types of banks (Sarap 1990; Jodhka 1995; Dre`ze et al. 1997).
3. Data
The data for this study come from the 2002-03 Debt and Investment Sur-
vey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation, which covered
143,285 households across India10, of which 91,192 were classified as rural.
The main purpose of the survey was to collect information on household
borrowings, liabilities and repayments, besides acquisition and loss of assets,
consumption expenditure and various demographic details. The survey took
place through two visits to each sampled household in the year 2003 which
were roughly 6 months apart. The first visit covered all items on the survey
questionnaire, while the second visit covered a subset of these: information
on loans and assets.
Throughout, means and proportions referred to are estimated statistics
for the population rather than the sample, since means and standard devia-
tions are calculated using probability weights and standard errors clustered
at the village level, yielding population-level estimates.
I restrict the analysis to 18 states of India11, excluding the North-Eastern
states, Jammu and Kashmir, and Delhi, and use data on Hindu farmer house-
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holds12. In the resulting sample, SCs constitute 15.44% of households, OBCs
52.26%, and Others 32.30%.
The wealth status of households, alongside their land ownership, is likely
to play an important role in shaping their access to credit. While the data
do not provide direct information on household income, there are at least
two ways of obtaining proxies for this. The first is the figure for monthly
per capita household consumption expenditure reported in the data, and
the second is by constructing an index of asset-ownership. Sahn & Stifel
(2003) advocate the latter, since mis-reporting can often jeopardize data on
expenditure. I follow this approach, and Appendix A details this argument
further and explains the procedure for constructing an assets index based on
consumer durables.
Variables on household characteristics include household size, the house-
hold head’s education level13 and age, in addition to the proportion of chil-
dren, adult males and adult females in the household.
71.4% of farmer households in our sample did not have any loan, while
20.8% had a single production loan from a formal source, and 7.8% had
two or more such loans. Focusing on the source of these formal production
loans, 54.6% came from cooperative banks, 40.8% came from commercial
banks, while the remaining 4.6% came from other formal sources14. Thus,
cooperative and commercial banks together accounted for over 95% of all
loans, and we drop households who had loans from formal sources other than
these two.
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Caste dominance at the district level is calculated using the caste group-
wise total ownership of land in a district15 and specifying the dominant caste
to be that which owns the maximum land. Based on this procedure, 7
districts are SC-dominated, 228 are OBC-dominated, and 167 are Others-
dominated.
Our final sample covers 402 districts across 18 states, and consists of
18,093 farmer households. Table A.1 summarizes the variables used and pro-
vides means and standard deviations for the overall population and according
to caste-group.
[Table A.1 about here]
4. Methodology and identification
We model the probability with which a farmer household obtains a pro-
duction loan from cooperative or commercial banks in two ways. We begin
by fitting several specifications of the probit model to analyze the probabil-
ity that a farmer household has a formal production loan. Next, we break
this down into two constituent sources—commercial and cooperative banks—
noting that these two categories account for over 95% of all formal loans, and
use bivariate probit specifications to model this joint outcome.
The univariate probit model assumes that the binary dependent vari-
able yi is determined according to whether a latent dependent variable y∗i is
positive or negative, where the latent variable is related to the independent
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variables xi through a linear specification with error term ￿i ∼ N [0, 1].
y∗i = x
￿
iβ + ￿i
and yi = 1 iﬀ y
∗
i > 0
so that
Prob(yi = 1) = Φ(x
￿
iβ)
The bivariate probit model specifies that there are two latent dependent
variables in two linear equations that each determines one of the dependent
binary outcomes being modeled (in our case these are whether a household
has a cooperative and/or commercial bank loan), as follows.
Allowing y1i (respectively, y2i) to represent the binary outcome corre-
sponding to whether a household has a cooperative (respectively, commer-
cial) bank loan, and x1 and x2 to be the corresponding vectors of explanatory
variables, we have
y∗1i = x
￿
1iβ1 + ￿1i
y∗2i = x
￿
2iβ2 + ￿2i
where
y1i = 1 iﬀ y
∗
1i > 0
y2i = 1 iﬀ y
∗
2i > 0
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and  ￿1
￿2
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
1 ρ
ρ 1


The error terms are assumed to follow a joint, bivariate normal distribution
with unit variance and covariance ρ. This allows us to determine the prob-
abilities for all four events of the type {y1, y2} where y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}. For
instance
Prob(y1i = 1, y2i = 0) = Prob(y
∗
1i > 0, y
∗
2i < 0)
= Prob(￿1i > −x￿1iβ1, ￿2i < −x￿2iβ2)
= Φ(x￿1iβ1)− Φ2(x￿1iβ1,x￿2iβ2)
where Φ2 represents the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate
normal distribution.
4.1. Double hurdle model
In order to examine whether caste influences loan amounts, we model
loan amounts together with the probability of obtaining a loan using double
hurdle models. This model is originally due to Cragg (1971), and has been
applied to household consumption decisions by Deaton & Irish (1984). We
use the specification of Moﬀatt (2005).
The double hurdle model is similar to the tobit model but extends it, by
dividing households into two types: those who would never borrower, and
those who might borrow given the appropriate circumstances—the potential
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borrowers. The first hurdle determines household type, while the second
hurdle models loan amounts for potential-borrower households16. In the fol-
lowing, the latent variable d∗i represents the first hurdle: a loan is observed
to be taken if and only if d∗i > 0, i.e. if a household is a potential borrower.
For potential-borrowers, the latent variable y∗∗i in the second hurdle models
whether the loan amount is zero (no loan taken) or positive. The equation
that determines y∗∗i is similar to a tobit model: if we define y
∗
i to be the
observed loan amount (where positive) and also include ‘no loan’ cases by
taking on the value zero, then y∗i = max{y∗∗i , 0}. Finally, since our data
contain loan amount observations only when the amounts are positive, then
representing this by yi, we can take into account both the probability of
crossing the first hurdle and, conditional on this, the second hurdle, so that
yi = di × y∗i .
d∗i = z
￿
iγ + ￿i (First hurdle)
y∗∗i = x
￿
iβ + µi (Second hurdle)
where  ￿
µ
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
1 0
0 σ2


The two error terms are assumed to be independently distributed; the vari-
ance of the first term is normalized to one while that of the second term is
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estimated as part of the model. We specify vectors of explanatory variables
x and z for, respectively, the first and second hurdles. The model is then
estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood that obtains from the model to
estimate the parameters γ, β and σ:
ln(L) =
￿
0
ln
￿
1− Φ(z￿iγ)Φ
￿
x￿iβ
σ
￿￿
+
￿
1
ln
￿
Φ(z￿iγ)
1
σ
φ
￿
yi − x￿iβ
σ
￿￿
4.2. Identification
We are able to identify the influence of caste on loan outcomes due to
ample household and district-level variation in caste. However the data tell
us household credit outcomes, that result from two events which we do not
observe independently: an application for credit, and the lender granting a
loan. Therefore, our analysis is valid subject to the assumption that caste-
based diﬀerences in the realized outcomes are attributable to the lender’s
decisions, and not to systematic diﬀerences in household demand and appli-
cations for credit. The assumption seems plausible, since demand for credit
is likely to depend on occupation and household characteristics that deter-
mine productivity, such as the availability of manpower and the ownership
of assets—the latter especially, since most loans need to be collaterialized. It
is unlikely that caste would play any residual role, i.e. beyond its role as a
correlate of characteristics which we control for. We discuss this issue further
in section 6.4.
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We must also assume that any diﬀerences in loan outcomes between co-
operative and commercial banks are not based on an underlying process of
caste-based sorting17. Otherwise, if commercial banks lend overwhelmingly
to SCs for instance due to aﬃrmative action policies, crowding out OBCs
and Others who then turn to cooperative banks, caste-based discrimination
would not be identified. We present supporting evidence for our view and
discuss this issue further in section 6.3.
Household caste is almost completely invariant across time, since indi-
viduals cannot change their caste. In addition, to be able to identify the
eﬀect of caste, it is necessary to assume that loan outcomes do not influ-
ence where a household resides; i.e., households should not have migrated in
search of credit. Indeed, caste-based migration is very low in India (Munshi
& Rosenzweig 2009), and, as Anderson (2011) argues using historical census
data, caste proportions in villages and by implication districts have remained
largely unchanged and are thus assumed to be exogenous.
For the explanatory variables relating to ownership of land and assets,
identification requires that access to credit does not determine ownership;
vice-versa, if current loans allowed borrowers to purchase land, then the rela-
tionship between land ownership and credit outcomes would not be identified.
We assume that production credit is used for its stated purpose—agricultural
production—and not for purchasing consumer durables or land. Even so, in
order to guard against the possibility that these assets were purchased us-
ing loans, we use data on loan outcomes from the second visit, and data on
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land and consumer durable assets from the first visit that took place approx-
imately 6 months earlier, so that the observed, current loan outcomes are
unlikely to have aided the acquisition of these assets18.
Land ownership is also unlikely to be related with current loan outcomes
since very little land gets traded in India, so that land ownership is likely a
function of intra-family land partitioning over successive generations rather
than the result of sales and purchases19. An additional issue could be that of
land reforms, which were aimed at reducing inequality in land ownership and
allowing cultivators to own land, and have historically focused on implement-
ing ownership ceilings (Besley & Burgess 2000) and redistributing holdings,
but there is no indication that these eﬀorts implemented redistribution by
encouraging access to credit.
5. Results
We start by analyzing the probability that a household obtains a for-
mal production loan given a vector of characteristics x that include caste
group, using probit models, and table A.2 reports the results from using dif-
ferent specifications. These, and all subsequent estimations are carried out
by weighting the observations using given probability weights, and standard
errors reported are clustered at the village level20.
All five models pass the Ramsey RESET specification test (Ramalho &
Ramalho 2011). Model 1 includes only caste group and state dummies as
explanatory variables. Model 2 adds ownership of irrigated and non-irrigated
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land and respective squared terms as explanatory variables to those of model
1, while model 3 adds the (log) assets index to model 2. Finally, models 4
and 5 add household characteristics as explanatory variables. These include
the household head’s age and education (model 4), household size and its
square, and the respective proportions of children, adult females and adult
males (model 5). These household characteristics are jointly significant in,
respectively, models 4 and 5, while the coeﬃcients for land ownership and the
assets index are positive and significant in models 3, 4 and 5. The latter is as
expected, since both types of land can act as collateral, enabling a household
to obtain a loan, and the assets index, similar to long-run income, captures
the fact that richer households are more likely to obtain a loan.
Household caste is significant only in models 1 and 2, and once assets
have been accounted for in model 3, this significance disappears. This in-
dicates that caste is correlated with the ownership of assets, and appears
as significant only if the latter is omitted. We conclude that while assets
and land ownership positively influence the probability of obtaining a formal
production loan, household caste does not have any significant influence on
borrowings if we do not distinguish between the sources of loans.
[Table A.2 about here]
5.1. Disaggregating borrowing by bank type and examining caste dominance
We now use bivariate probit models to disaggregate formal borrowing by
bank type, and study the bivariate probability of a household obtaining a
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loan from either a cooperative or commercial bank or both. Over two thirds
of households (12,569) in our sample do not have a loan from either type of
bank. Of the remainder, just over half (2,824) have loans from cooperative
banks only, while 2,392 households have loans from commercial banks only,
and a small number (308) have loans from both types of bank.
Table A.3 presents results from three specifications of the bivariate probit
model, using two columns for each model that correspond, respectively, to
cooperative and commercial bank borrowings. Model 1 uses state dummies,
household caste, characteristics of the household head, land ownership and
assets as explanatory variables. Unlike the corresponding univariate probit
model 4 in table A.2, household caste is now significant, and remains sig-
nificant with the introduction of other household characteristics as explana-
tory variables—the proportion of children, adult males and adult females—in
model 2. And, as with the univariate probit models, land ownership and as-
sets exert a positive influence on the probability of having either type of loan,
and are statistically significant in all models.
[Table A.3 about here]
That the influence of caste is very diﬀerent for the two types of bank can
be deduced from the signs and significance of the respective caste coeﬃcients.
The base category is Others, so that both models 1 and 2 indicate that SCs
and OBCs are less likely to have a loan from a cooperative bank compared
to Others. For commercial bank loans, SCs are most likely to have a loan,
19
followed by Others and finally OBCs, in agreement, it would appear, with
aﬃrmative action policies. Models 1 and 2 thus show that cooperative banks
might discriminate between borrowers on the basis of caste, since, even after
controlling for the most apparent criteria of loan-worthiness, namely assets
and land ownership alongside other household characteristics, caste continues
to be statistically significant, and lower-caste SCs have a lower probability of
having a cooperative bank loan compared to higher-caste Others. A central
task of this paper is to explain why this may be.
We therefore test whether district-level caste dominance, as defined by
caste-aggregate land ownership, plays a role in explaining loan outcomes.
Model 3 introduces a categorical variable for district-level caste dominance,
and interaction terms between this caste dominance variable and household
caste21. Together with household head characteristics and other household
characteristics, Wald tests show that the caste-based interaction terms are
strongly significant, and hence we base our analysis and conclusions on model
3.
Our task now is to explain how caste and district-dominant caste influence
loan outcomes. To do so, we calculate the marginal probabilities predicted
by model 3 for each type of bank loan. So, given the probability function
estimated using model 3, we calculate Prob(Household has cooperative bank
loan | x) for a given vector x of household characteristics, and likewise for
commercial bank loans. We repeat this calculation several times, replacing
the values for the assets index, household, and subsequently dominant caste
20
by, respectively, deciles of the assets index and all combinations of caste, to
obtain the mean predicted probability for each combination of (asset decile,
household caste) or (asset decile, household caste, dominant caste). Finally,
mean predicted probabilities are plotted to enable comparison across castes
and asset levels (and subsequently dominant caste). Following this procedure,
we first quantify the influence of household caste by calculating the marginal
probabilities for each type of bank. The results from this are shown in figure
A.1.
[Figure A.1 about here]
As expected, the probability of borrowing from either type of bank in-
creases with asset decile. The influence of caste is opposite between the two
types of banks. Higher-caste Others are more likely to have a loan from
a cooperative bank compared to both OBCs and SCs (the latter are least
likely to have a loan). The reverse holds for commercial banks, where SCs
are most likely to have a loan, followed by Others and finally OBCs. A
possible explanation for the latter low probability is that OBCs emerge as
the ‘squeezed middle’ category: while the upper castes are historically well-
endowed and SCs benefit from aﬃrmative-action in the targeting of com-
mercial bank credit, there are no such allowances for OBCs. Indeed, unlike
admissions to educational institutions or job quotas in government employ-
ment where OBCs do benefit from aﬃrmative-action policies, there is no
counterpart to this in agricultural credit. However, as the confidence inter-
21
vals in figure A.1b show, few of the between-caste diﬀerences in predicted
probabilities for commercial banks are statistically significant.
To examine the influence of district level caste dominance, we likewise cal-
culate the predicted probabilities for combinations of asset decile, household
caste, and dominant caste. This yields 90 categories because there are ten
asset deciles and nine combinations of household and dominant caste. How-
ever, since only seven (out of 402) districts are dominated by SC households,
we restrict the discussion to OBC and Others-dominated districts22.
[Figure A.2 about here]
Figure A.2 shows how the probabilities for cooperative bank loans change
with dominant and household caste, and summarizes an important finding
of the paper. In districts dominated by higher-caste Others, it is Others who
have the highest probability of having a cooperative bank loan. OBCs and
SCs have lower probabilities for all asset levels, and the majority of these dif-
ferences are statistically significant. Indeed, SCs have the lowest probability
of having a cooperative bank loan, and the diﬀerences between Others and
SCs are significant at all asset levels. The magnitude of the diﬀerence is also
large: for the third to seventh asset deciles, Others have a cooperative bank
loan with probability at least 0.2, while the same probability for SCs is at
most 0.1.
In contrast, for districts dominated by the OBC group, there are no sta-
tistically significant between-caste diﬀerences. While Others have higher
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probability at lower asset levels, OBCs have the highest loan probability at
higher asset levels, but none of these diﬀerences are significant. SCs continue
to have the lowest loan probability even in OBC dominated districts, but
again, the diﬀerence between SCs and other caste groups are not statistically
significant.
The significant influence of district level caste dominance on the function-
ing of cooperative banks is a central finding of this paper. It lends support to
the hypothesis that interest group capture at the district level is the reason
why cooperative banks discriminate against lower caste households. This
takes place in districts where traditionally empowered higher-castes domi-
nate, but not where the traditionally backward OBC or SC caste groups are
dominant. As our discussion of the cooperative bank structure explained,
the district plays an important role in how village level cooperatives function
throughout the district, and the likely path through which dominant interest-
groups influence the functioning of district CCBs is through the profile of per-
sonnel who run CCBs. Further, since CCBs are independent entities, there
would be no procedure of transferring employees between locations unlike
commercial bank branches, further strengthening the influence of entrenched
interests.
An associated question could be why OBC-dominated districts do not
witness discrimination in favour of OBCs at the cost of Others or SCs. The
answer to this would lie in the manner in which influence between caste
groups has been devolved over the past few decades. It is only recently that
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OBCs (and to a lesser extent SCs) have seen their influence rise and become
comparable to Others. The non-high castes, even when the dominant eco-
nomic group in the district, are unlikely to see their influence spanning multi-
ple channels and institutions simply because the traditional power structures
which survive at least partially today, would not allow for this. An OBC-
dominant district is thus unlikely to have OBCs occupying entrenched posi-
tions of power in society and government or semi-government institutions, in
contrast to the influence of Others in an Others-dominated district.
While our finding of caste-dominance is consistent with field studies, it
is important that we have established this using national data. Dre`ze et al.
(1997) highlighted the role of bias (caste and otherwise) using data from a
single village in northern India23. Likewise, Shah et al. (2007) point out in
their review of cooperative bank credit that cooperative societies were prone
to capture because they “were embroiled in local power politics and were a
source of rural patronage and influence” (Shah et al. 2007, 1352). And, Am-
bewadikar (1991) reports that casteism and politics are major reasons why
members of weaker sections of society24 fail to obtain loans from cooperative
credit societies in rural Maharashtra.
Figure A.3 shows that the interactions between district caste dominance
and household caste do not have a significant influence on the probability
of obtaining a commercial bank loan. This suggests that commercial banks
are unlikely to be susceptible to interest group capture, which is probably
a result of their centralized structures, routine staﬀ transfer policies, and
24
professional management practices.
[Figure A.3 about here]
5.2. Double-hurdle model for loan amounts
In order to examine whether discrimination extends to the loan amounts
provided by banks, we employ double-hurdle models for borrowings from
cooperative and commercial banks separately. The dependent variable in
each case is the log total loan amount whenever that amount is positive, and
zero otherwise25. This total includes all respective loans a household might
have. Table A.4 shows the population and caste-wise mean loan amounts,
and indeed, all the between-caste diﬀerences are statistically significant. Our
aim in this section is to deduce whether these diﬀerences persist, and if so
their pattern, even after accounting for plausible explanatory variables.
[Table A.4 about here]
The results from double hurdle models for loan amounts from coopera-
tive and commercial banks (separately) are presented in table A.5. We show
results for the most general specification, including state, household caste
and dominant caste, household characteristics, land ownership and assets.
Wald tests for both ‘decision’ equations are strongly significant, implying
that the double hurdle model is preferred over the simple tobit. Similar to
the results from the bivariate probit model, caste terms are significant in the
decision equation for cooperative banks only, but they are insignificant in
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the equation for loan amount. Hence, cooperative loan amounts do not diﬀer
significantly by caste conditional on obtaining a loan. However, caste and
district dominance interaction terms are also significant in the amount equa-
tion for cooperative banks, indicating that loan amounts from cooperative
banks depend on the combination of household and district dominant caste.
[Table A.5 about here]
To examine how caste and dominant caste influence cooperative bank
amounts, we use a similar procedure as before and calculate the (log) loan
amounts predicted by the amount equation for subpopulations defined by
asset decile, household caste, and dominant caste. The resulting predictions
are plotted in figure A.4. The influence of caste is similar to that on the
probability of obtaining cooperative bank loans, in that for Others-dominated
districts, households in the Others caste group are likely to receive larger
loans compared to OBCs and SCs, conditional on receiving a loan. However,
none of the between-caste diﬀerences are significant at diﬀerent asset deciles,
in either OBC or Others-dominated districts. We conclude that while the
data indicate that interest-group capture of cooperative banks in Others-
dominated districts potentially extends to the amount of loan sanctioned,
this pattern is not statistically significant.
Since neither household caste nor interaction terms with dominant caste
are significant in either equation for commercial banks, we conclude that
caste does not influence the size of loans obtained from commercial banks.
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[Figure A.4 about here]
6. Alternative explanations
In this section we explore alternative explanations for the caste-based
diﬀerences in the loan outcomes, which we have so far explained in terms of
the lending decisions of banks.
6.1. Interest rates
Caste-based diﬀerences in interest rates could lead to diﬀerences in de-
mand for loans, which in turn might drive loan outcomes. For example, if
SCs were oﬀered higher interest rates than Others by a certain type of bank,
this would lead to fewer SC households taking loans. The analysis so far
would explain the latter outcome in terms of the banks’ reduced willingness
to sanction a loan to an SC household, whereas in fact the correct explana-
tion would then be that a higher interest rate leads to reduced demand from
SCs.
Table A.6 shows the population and caste-wise mean interest rates on
loans. For households with more than one loan from a given type of bank,
the interest rate is calculated as the weighted mean across all loans using the
loan amounts as weights. There are 16 households with cooperative bank
loans for whom interest rate information is missing. In addition, there are
also some outliers in the data. Table A.6 retains households up to the 95th
percentile of interest rate in order to remove the outliers. Wald tests for the
27
equality of interest rates across caste groups show that there are no significant
between-caste diﬀerences for cooperative bank loans26. Interest rates are thus
unlikely to explain the finding that cooperative banks discriminate against
lower-caste borrowers.
For commercial bank loans, the interest rates charged from SCs are signif-
icantly lower than those charged from OBCs and Others. These findings are
consistent with the aﬃrmative-action policy guidelines of the Central Bank,
since preferential lending for SC/ST households also includes lending at lower
rates of interest under the Diﬀerential Rate of Interest (DRI) Scheme accord-
ing to which “(I)t should be ensured that not less than 40 per cent of the
total advances granted under DRI scheme go to scheduled caste/scheduled
tribes. At least two third of DRI advances should be granted through rural
and semi-urban branches” (RBI 2006, 4).
[Table A.6 about here]
6.2. Repayment rates
In the event that banks maintain and exchange information on the credit
histories of potential borrowers, a household’s loan outcomes would depend
on their past repayment behavior. In the US context, Becker (1993) ar-
gues that past repayment and default behavior must be taken into account
to determine whether banks discriminate between borrowers on the basis
of race, since lending patterns which we might otherwise conclude indicate
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racial discrimination might actually reflect repayment histories. Our analy-
sis has presented strong evidence in favor of the view that cooperative banks
discriminate negatively against SC households, and weak evidence that com-
mercial banks discriminate positively. These conclusions would remain valid
even if loan outcomes did depend on repayment behavior, but they might
not, if there exist caste-based diﬀerences in repayment rates.
In the Indian context, it is unlikely that Indian banks base lending deci-
sions on credit ratings given that credit bureaus and the associated processes
have only recently begun to expand. The data, however, do provide informa-
tion on the recent credit histories of borrowers, and we use this to examine
whether there are systematic caste-based diﬀerences in repayment rates using
the ratio of total repayment to total loan amount.
The data provide information on the repayments made by households in,
approximately, the year prior to the date of survey27. Out of 2,700 house-
holds with a commercial bank loan, 202 did not make any repayments, while
out of 3,132 households with cooperative bank loans, 2,041—a far higher
number—did not make any repayments during this period. We calculate the
ratio of total repayments during this period to total loan amounts, for those
households who had outstanding loans on the date of survey, as shown in
table A.7. However, Wald tests for equality of mean repayment ratios across
caste groups show that most between-caste diﬀerences in repayment ratios
are insignificant, whether we consider all households together or only those
who made positive repayments.
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The only exception to this is in the case of households with commercial
bank loans, where the repayments made by SCs are significantly lower than
those of Others, for households who made positive repayments. This implies
that if commercial banks do base their lending decisions on repayment be-
havior, then all else being equal, they should lend less often to SCs. That
commercial banks bias borrowing towards SCs would then imply that af-
firmative action policies favor SCs suﬃciently strongly to ensure that they
receive loans at least, if not more often, than their non-SC counterparts,
despite potentially poorer repayment behavior.
[Table A.7 about here]
6.3. Caste-based sorting
There is also the possibility that the observed patterns of lending reflect
a sorting process between cooperative and commercial banks. That is, given
that commercial banks are encouraged to lend to SCs, this might crowd out
higher castes who then approach cooperative banks. While this possibility
cannot be ruled out entirely using the data at hand, it is unlikely that such
sorting is responsible for the observed loan outcomes given the cultural and
political context of India. Commercial banks account for the majority of
agricultural credit in India (GOI 2007), and thus have greater funds avail-
able for lending compared to cooperative banks28, making it doubtful that
their commitments to weaker sections of society crowd out lending to OBCs
and Others. And, since the interest rates reported in table A.6 show that
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cooperative banks charge somewhat higher rates than do commercial banks,
a commercial bank loan should be, on this basis, the first preference of all
borrowers irrespective of caste.
Moreover, were a sorting process at play, we might expect the caste-based
lending patterns for cooperative and commercial banks to be an opposing,
mirror image of each other. Instead, as figure A.1 shows, caste-based diﬀer-
ences in the probability of obtaining a loan are significant only for coopera-
tive banks. This supports the view that aﬃrmative action has, in the case
of commercial banks, succeeded in overcoming any caste-based diﬀerences
that might otherwise disadvantage lower caste borrowers, but not at the cost
of higher caste borrowers. But since no such aﬃrmative action has taken
place for cooperative banks, their lending remains vulnerable to caste-based
interest group capture.
Finally, it is unlikely that district-level caste dominance would be a signif-
icant influence on the caste-wise probabilities of obtaining loans, were in fact
a sorting process responsible for the caste-wise diﬀerences in loan outcomes.
Instead, caste-wise diﬀerences are significant only for cooperative banks, and
only in districts where Others are dominant (figure A.2). This lends sup-
port to the view that interest-group capture by higher-caste groups results
in lower castes facing discrimination in these districts.
31
6.4. Diﬀerences in demand
As discussed in Section 4.2, the identification of caste-based diﬀerences in
banks’ willingness to lend depends on the assumption that household demand
for credit does not depend systematically on caste once we have controlled
for other household characteristics. While this assumption cannot be tested
with the current data, there are at least two arguments in favor. First, we
argued that households’ own perceptions of the ease with which credit might
be granted by a bank, and thus their propensity to apply for such, will almost
certainly vary according to wealth, land-ownership and education levels, but
not, once these factors have been accounted for, with caste. Jodhka (1995)
quotes poor farmers on their (very negative) perceptions of certain formal
lenders, as a result of which they have been very hesitant to apply for credit.
Such borrowers are often also of lower caste, but it would be spurious to
argue that their perception of formal lenders’ unwillingness to lend are a
result of their caste even after taking into account other characteristics, i.e.
beyond the fact that they are poor and marginalized. Indeed, a convincing
counter-argument could be made only if we observed instances where poor
and marginalized higher caste farmers had positive perceptions of formal
lenders, but the latter is a rather unrealistic possibility.
Second, it is important to note the view of Dre`ze et al. (1997, 24) on this
issue (authors’ emphasis):
The question remains as to whether poor households are unable
or unwilling to borrow substantial amounts from other institu-
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tional sources. It would be pointless to seek a general answer to
this question. We have met several poor individuals who emphat-
ically stated that they would never dare to borrow from a public
lending institution (for fear of being cheated or of not being able
to repay); we also know others who have made repeated but un-
successful attempts to persuade a bank manager to give them a
loan. The point is that, in both cases, (1) there is a failure of
public provision of credit services to poor borrowers, and (2) the
root of the problem lies in the discriminatory practices of public
lending institutions.
This clearly supports the view that diﬀerences in demand and discrimi-
natory practices can both be expected to move together, implying that the
identifying assumption made earlier is indeed plausible for the rural Indian
context.
7. Conclusion
Using national data on household borrowings, our main finding is that
banks do discriminate between borrowers on the basis of caste in the pro-
vision of agricultural credit. For commercial banks, we find weak evidence
of positive discrimination that favors lower-caste SC households, but for co-
operative banks, we find strong evidence that discrimination is negative and
favors higher caste Others households.
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The explanations for the two patterns are very diﬀerent. For commercial
banks, the observed lending behavior is consistent with aﬃrmative action
policies aimed at improving financial inclusion for SC households through
increased lending and lower rates of interest. For cooperative banks on the
other hand, we test the hypothesis that capture at the district level by locally
dominant interest groups leads to discrimination. We find that negative
discrimination is most visible in districts where higher castes dominate, and
is insignificant in districts where OBCs dominate. Given the organization
and structure of cooperative banks in India, District Central Cooperative
Banks play a key role in overseeing the lending of village cooperatives in each
district. We thus find support for the hypothesis that capture at the district
level takes place through entrenched interests gaining hold of cooperative
bank management which in turn shapes the latter’s lending decisions. This
is also consistent with several field studies which examine the functioning of
cooperative banks, even as our conclusions are based on national data.
We also analyze how loan amounts are influenced by borrowers’ castes,
and find weak evidence that discrimination by cooperative banks extends to
loan amounts as well. Finally, interest rates and repayment rates do not, in
general, depend on borrowers’ castes, but in the few cases where they do,
they do so in ways that lend support to our findings.
Notes
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1India’s central bank.
2See Sen (2005) for a detailed discussion of the latter issue.
3The land-ownership based definition of dominance has been used by Anderson (2011)
who analyzes the market for irrigation water in northern India. Using this to define
village-level caste dominance, she finds that lower castes are less likely to participate in
the market for irrigation water in villages dominated by higher castes, and thus, have
lower agricultural incomes in such villages.
4As Weisskopf (2004) explains, the definition of OBCs is complex, since this category
includes lower-caste Hindus as well as other sub-groups from other religious and ethnic
minorities. We restrict our analysis to households classified as Hindu.
5A second reason for excluding STs from the analysis is that areas where tribal pop-
ulations are dominant are likely to be systematically diﬀerent, and possibly have fewer
financial institutions, making it diﬃcult to identify discrimination.
6In the absence of formal financial services, particularly credit, poor borrowers usu-
ally turn to informal lenders who are known to charge unreasonably high interest rates.
Informal credit transactions, such as those between sharecroppers and landlords or mon-
eylenders, have also been explained in the literature in terms of interlinkages with other
factor markets (Bardhan & Rudra 1978; Bardhan 1980; Basu 1983, 2000)
7This structure is, however, not uniformly implemented across all states. See Sen
(2005).
8A substantial literature has analyzed whether banks in the US discriminate between
borrowers applying for mortgages on the basis of race, since home ownership is a deci-
sive economic outcome in the American context. While the evidence is mixed, several
researchers have concluded that discrimination does indeed take place (Charles & Hurst
2002; Cavalluzzo 2002; Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo 1998; Blanchflower et al. 2003).
9Indian government reports such as that by the National Sample Survey Organisation
(2005) provide summary statistics from household surveys but do not, as such, analyze
the data.
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10With the exception of certain areas in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, and the An-
daman and Nicobar Islands
11Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jhark-
hand, Karnataka, Kerala, MP, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,
Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and West Bengal.
12The data classify a household head’s occupation using 16 categories and also clas-
sify each household into one of four types: self-employed in non-agriculture, agricultural
labour, other labour, self-employed in agriculture, and others. ‘Farmer households’ are
those classified as ‘self-employed in agriculture’ and the occupation of whose household
head is ‘agriculture’. Households classified as agricultural labour are excluded since such
households are likely to form a distinct category who are poorer than farmers and unlikely
to own land or rent it for cultivation. I also drop Scheduled Tribes (ST) households, since
as mentioned, they are not usually considered as part of the caste system.
13Classified in the following categories: illiterate, literate without formal schooling, lit-
erate but below primary, primary schooling, middle schooling, secondary schooling, higher
secondary schooling, diploma/certificate course, graduate, post graduate and above.
14These include government schemes, insurance providers, provident funds, (non-bank)
financial institutions and companies.
15For this step, ST, non-Hindu and non-farmer households are included in the calcula-
tions. ST-dominated districts are then dropped.
16Whereas, the tobit specification assumes that all households belong to the second
category. The double-hurdle model is therefore more general.
17I am grateful to a referee for highlighting this issue.
18Identification would be compromised only if there are unobservables correlated with
both assets-ownership and loan outcomes. To this end, covariates that are likely to play
this role have been controlled for.
19In their study of a the Palanpur village in Northern India, Dre`ze et al. (1997) document
that a very small proportion of land in the village was traded.
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20We must note that the use of probability weights implies that the probit models are
estimated by maximizing the pseudo log-likelihood and the resulting maximized value of
such cannot be used to compare between specifications of the model, nor can it be used to
generate likelihood-based statistics such as the Akaike Information Criteria (or Likelihood
ratio tests). As such, the only valid criteria for selecting between models is by using Wald
tests to judge the significance of (diﬀerent sets of) variables (Korn & Graubard 1990).
The significance of individual coeﬃcients in all the estimations are, for the same reason,
reported as based on Wald tests instead of t-tests.
21Household caste and district-dominant caste are both categorical variables with three
categories each, corresponding to SC, OBC and Others. Interacting these yields nine cate-
gories. Since both household caste and district-dominant caste also appear in the equation
individually, only four of the nine interaction terms are entered in the estimation: these
are SC*SC-dominant, SC*OBC-dominant, OBC*SC-dominant, OBC*OBC-dominant.
22The predicted probabilities for SC-dominated districts have wide confidence intervals
and do not have significant between-caste diﬀerences.
23While comparisons based on caste-dominance was not the focus of the Dre`ze et al.
(1997) study, the village where data was collected – Palanpur – would qualify as an
Others-dominated village in view of the land-ownership patterns they document. The
authors detail how caste (and privilege) based biases influenced loans made by a certain
cooperative bank (the ‘Farmers Service Society’).
24‘Weaker sections’ refers here to SC, ST and small farmers (Ambewadikar 1991).
25Since all loans are at least Re. 1, there are no negative log loan amounts.
26If we include the outliers, then interest rates do diﬀer between castes, but the interest
rates for SCs are on average lower than those of OBCs and Others. This would then add
support to our previous analysis: if at all, it would appear that SC households should have
higher demand for cooperative bank loans if indeed they are oﬀered lower interest rates.
The fact that we observe fewer SC households with cooperative bank loans in Others-
dominated districts would imply that negative discrimination is then even stronger than
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we have estimated, and were interest rates to be the same, then SC households would have
even fewer cooperative bank loans.
27Repayment amounts are detailed for each of three periods: July 2002-Sept 2002, Oct
2002-Dec 2002, Jan 2003 to the date of survey.
28In 2002-03, commercial banks provided Rs. 397,740 million of agricultural credit
compared to Rs. 236,360 million from cooperative banks (GOI 2007, 36) .
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Appendix A. Calculating the assets-based wealth index
Sahn & Stifel (2003) argue that information elicited about consumption
expenditure during surveys is likely to be both inaccurate because of recall
or truth-telling problems, as well as unrepresentative of long-run household
wealth since poor households’ consumption exhibits substantial seasonal or
other variation, while that of rich households may not allow for eﬀectively
diﬀerentiating between levels of wealth or income. As an alternative, they
suggest calculating an index based on assets that the household owns, and
using this as a proxy for income or wealth. Such an index can be calculated
using principal components analysis, that seeks to find a linear combination
of assets that maximizes variance across the sample (Filmer & Pritchett
2001). We calculate such an index based on consumer durable assets.
Principal components analysis is used to construct this wealth index as
follows: The data are arranged into column vectors, each of which correspond
to a particular type of asset, and each entry of which gives the number of that
asset owned a given household. Principal components analysis then creates
linear combinations of column vectors by determining suitable weights such
that these combinations are a) orthogonal to each other, and b) account for
the maximum amount of the variance across households. The weighting at-
taches minimum importance to features common across households and vice
versa: if most households own a single bed for instance, then this column will
receive a small weight. The first principal component contains the maximum
variance and can thus be used as an index of asset ownership. While the
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data provide information on ownership of several categories of assets includ-
ing transport and business equipment, residential buildings and consumer
durables, we use only the last category since it is the only category com-
mon across all households. And, certain types of consumer durables such as
bullion have very few observations. Dropping such categories, the types of
consumer durables considered for principal components analysis are:
1. Bedstead
2. Steel / wooden almirah / dressing table
3. Radio, record player/tape recorder/stereo/ musical instruments for house-
hold use
4. Television, VCR/VCP/VCD, DVD Player, home theatre, multimedia PC
5. Pressure cooker/ household utensils
6. Gas/electric oven/cooking range/ microwave oven
7. Electric fan, clock/ watch, water filter / electric iron/ sewing machine
8. Refrigerator/ air cooler/ air conditioner/ washing machine
The first principal component captures 34.7% of the total variance in durable
assets across households. The resulting assets index takes on values in the interval
(-1.71, 17.36) and we calculate its log by adding 2 to each observation.
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(a) Cooperative bank loans
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(b) Commercial bank loans
Figure A.1: Influence of household caste on predicted loan probabilities
(Source: Calculations based on model 3 in table A.3)
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Figure A.2: Influence of dominant and household caste on the probability of
borrowing from a cooperative bank
(Source: Calculations based on model 3 in table A.3)
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Figure A.3: Influence of dominant and household caste on the probability of
borrowing from a commercial bank
(Source: Calculations based on model 3 in table A.3)
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Figure A.4: Influence of dominant and household caste on predicted log loan
amounts from cooperative banks
(Source: Calculations based on results from table A.5)
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Tables
Table A.1: Means and standard deviations of variables for population and
caste groups
Population SC OBC Others
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Irrigated land owned (Ha) 0.863 1.556 0.500 0.905 0.829 1.550 1.091 1.740
Unrrigated land owned (Ha) 0.603 1.641 0.269 0.797 0.593 1.639 0.779 1.873
Log assets index 0.382 0.725 0.078 0.658 0.312 0.695 0.640 0.719
Age of household head 47.803 14.117 46.363 14.331 47.236 13.739 49.407 14.448
Household size 5.700 2.875 5.559 2.856 5.811 2.894 5.589 2.841
Proportion of children 0.368 0.229 0.386 0.242 0.383 0.230 0.333 0.216
Proportion of adult males 0.320 0.175 0.319 0.191 0.313 0.172 0.330 0.170
Proportion of adult females 0.310 0.150 0.294 0.158 0.300 0.145 0.335 0.152
Median education level literate but illiterate literate but primary schooling
of household head below primary below primary
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A.2: Probit models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
SC -0.238∗∗∗ -0.0689 -0.0155 0.0407 0.0187
(0.0532) (0.0564) (0.0567) (0.0568) (0.0576)
OBC -0.185∗∗∗ -0.0979∗ -0.0670 -0.0420 -0.0593
(0.0462) (0.0495) (0.0494) (0.0493) (0.0501)
Others (base) - - - - -
Irrig land owned 0.266∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0190)
Irrig land owned square -0.00833∗∗∗ -0.00745∗∗∗ -0.00722∗∗∗ -0.00680∗∗∗
(0.00147) (0.00142) (0.00133) (0.00132)
Nonirrig land owned 0.170∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Nonirrig land owned square -0.00666∗∗∗ -0.00631∗∗∗ -0.00608∗∗∗ -0.00596∗∗∗
(0.00163) (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00155)
Log assets index 0.152∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0737∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0256) (0.0270)
Household head characteristicsa yes yes
Other household characteristicsb yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 18093 18093 18093 18093 18093
Significance (p-values under Wald tests)
Household caste 0.000 0.142 0.318 0.219 0.214
Notes
Dependent variable: Household has formal production loan
Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Age, age-squared, and education level of household head
b Household size and its square, proportions of children, adult males and adult females
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A.3: Bivariate Probit models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coop Comm Coop Comm Coop Comm
SC -0.167∗ 0.154∗∗ -0.189∗∗ 0.140∗ -0.336∗∗∗ 0.0731
(0.0674) (0.0557) (0.0686) (0.0562) (0.0935) (0.0766)
OBC -0.0870 -0.0135 -0.104 -0.0249 -0.247∗∗ -0.0380
(0.0546) (0.0431) (0.0555) (0.0434) (0.0889) (0.0629)
Others (base) - - - - - -
Irrig land owned 0.0954∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗∗ 0.0905∗∗∗ 0.0903∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0136) (0.0176) (0.0137) (0.0178) (0.0138)
Nonirrig land owned 0.0487∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0128)
Log assets index 0.102∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0652∗ 0.0981∗∗ 0.0667∗ 0.0995∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0296) (0.0310) (0.0317) (0.0312) (0.0318)
SC*SC-dominated 1.940∗∗∗ 0.271
(0.454) (0.479)
SC*OBC-dominated 0.326∗ 0.0326
(0.129) (0.108)
OBC*SC-dominated 1.144∗ 0.928
(0.567) (0.545)
OBC*OBC-dominated 0.254∗ -0.0712
(0.109) (0.0855)
State dummies yes yes yes
Household heada yes yes yes
characteristics
Other householdb yes yes
characteristics
ρˆ -0.096 -0.099 -0.099
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
N 18093 18093 18093
Significance (p-values under Wald tests)
Household caste 0.002 0.001 0.002
Household and dominant 0.000
caste interaction terms
Notes
Bivariate dependent variable: (cooperative loan, commercial loan).
Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Age, age-squared, and education level of household head.
b Household size and its square, proportions of children, adult males and adult females.
Source: Author’s calculations. 54
Table A.4: Total loan amountsa (in Rupees)
Population SC OBC Others
Bank Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Cooperative 30,561 57,654 14,328 23,135 27,332 52,338 37,798 64,923
Commercial 43,374 72,492 22,499 42,669 42,041 66,171 54,113 85,179
a Calculated using those households who have a loan from the respective type of bank.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A.5: Double hurdle models for loan amounts
Cooperative Commercial
Decision Amount Decision Amount
SC -0.336∗∗∗ -0.0775 0.0739 -0.128
(0.0934) (0.138) (0.0763) (0.136)
OBC -0.248∗∗ -0.126 -0.0380 -0.121
(0.0890) (0.0945) (0.0630) (0.101)
Others (base) - - - -
Irrig land owned 0.0905∗∗∗ 0.0991∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0211) (0.0138) (0.0180)
Nonirrig land owned 0.0455∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0167)
Log assets index 0.0667∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.0986∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0460) (0.0318) (0.0486)
SC*SC-dominated 1.905∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗ 0.275 -0.756
(0.457) (0.486) (0.482) (0.432)
SC*OBC-dominated 0.330∗ 0.0865 0.0342 -0.0139
(0.129) (0.176) (0.108) (0.164)
OBC*SC-dominated 1.107 0.0508 0.936 -1.698∗∗
(0.574) (0.535) (0.548) (0.586)
OBC*OBC-dominated 0.257∗ 0.115 -0.0686 0.0905
(0.109) (0.129) (0.0855) (0.141)
State dummies yes yes
Household head characteristicsa yes yes
Other household characteristicsb yes yes
N 18093 18093
Significance (p-values under Wald tests)
Household caste 0.001 0.385 0.356 0.394
Household and dominant 0.000 0.048 0.684 0.303
caste interaction terms
Notes
Dependent variable is log total loan amount from the respective bank type.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Age, age-squared, and education level of household head.
b Household size and its square, proportions of children, adult males and
adult females.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A.6: Interest rates from cooperative and commercial banks (in percent)
Population SC OBC Others
Bank Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Cooperative 12.97 2.61 12.66 3.26 12.98 2.79 13.03 2.23
Commercial 12.15 2.87 11.49 3.90 12.19 2.82 12.38 2.41
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table A.7: Ratios of total repayment to total loan amounts
Population SC OBC Others
Bank Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Cooperative 0.173 0.328 0.149 0.333 0.166 0.333 0.185 0.318
Commercial 0.152 0.303 0.130 0.266 0.155 0.311 0.157 0.299
Source: Author’s calculations.
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